Deutsche Bank Fire Defendants All Acquitted Of Charges.

Last week, the three defendants charged with manslaughter and other charges of causing the fatalities at the former Deutsche Bank building, were acquitted of all charges.  The jury cleared two former managers, Jeffrey Melofchik and Salvatore DePaolo, on June 29, while the Criminal Court Judge Rena K. Uviller acquitted Mitchel Alvo, on July 6.  Uviller also tossed out the major charges against the subcontractor, The John Galt Corp., convicting the company only of a misdemeanor count of reckless endangerment.

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The former Deutsche Bank building was undergoing asbestos abatement and demolition at the time of the fire in 2007, that caused the death of firefighters Robert Beddia 53, and Joseph Graffagnino, 33, who died trying to fight the blaze.  Charges included multiple counts of negligent homicide, manslaughter and reckless endangerment.
Defense attorneys were able to convince the judge and jury that the actual causes were more complicated.  Those complications included:

• New York City Fire Dept. did not abide by the 15-day rule of inspections
• Errors made by the Lower Manhattan Development Corp. (LMDC)
• The negative air system used in the abatement caused rising smoke to descend and block the firefighters vision.

It seems this may not be the end of the Deutsche Bank fire issues, because the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, which felt that the wrong people were charged, and thought the defendants were scapegoats, released the following statement: "We urge the Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance heed his self-described duty as to do what is right in every case without fear or favor, wherever that may lead by re-opening an investigation into the Deutsche Bank fire.  In fact, we are demanding that the District Attorney conduct an investigation into the LMDC."

OSHA Proposes $51,000 in Fines Against David H. Koch Theater in New York for Asbestos, Fall and Crushing Hazards

Image via WikipediaThe Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has cited the David H. Koch Theater, located at the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in Manhattan, for alleged repeat and serious violations of workplace health and safety standards. The theater faces a total of $51,000 in proposed fines, chiefly for asbestos, fall and crushing hazards identified during an OSHA inspection prompted by worker complaints.

OSHA's inspection found that employees of the theater and of outside contractors had not been informed of the presence of asbestos-containing and potentially asbestos-containing materials in the theater's promenade area and in nearby electrical closets. The materials had not been labeled and asbestos warning signs had not been posted.
In addition, an exit door was stuck and unable to be used, and a portable fire extinguisher was not mounted. As these conditions were similar to those cited by OSHA during a 2009 inspection of the theater, they resulted in the agency issuing the theater four repeat citations with $45,000 in proposed fines. A repeat violation is issued when an employer previously has been cited for the same or a similar violation of a standard, regulation, rule or order at any other facility in federal enforcement states within the last five years.
"The recurrence of these conditions is disturbing," said Kay Gee, OSHA's Manhattan area director. "For the health and safety of its employees as well as outside contractors, the theater must take effective steps to identify and permanently eliminate these and other hazards identified during this latest OSHA inspection."
OSHA also found that, due to a lack of guarding, theater employees were exposed to falls into the orchestra pit when the stage was raised above the pit, and to being struck or crushed by the stage when it descended into the pit. These conditions, plus the use of temporary wiring in place of permanent lighting in the promenade area, resulted in OSHA also issuing the theater three serious citations with $6,000 in proposed fines. A serious citation is issued when there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should have known.
"One means of eliminating hazards such as these is for employers to establish an illness and injury prevention program, in which workers and management jointly work to identify and eliminate hazardous conditions on a continual basis," said Robert Kulick, OSHA's regional administrator in New York.
The theater has 15 business days from receipt of the citations and proposed penalties to comply, request an informal conference with OSHA's area director or contest the findings before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The inspection was conducted by OSHA's Manhattan Area Office, telephone 212-620-3200. To report workplace accidents, fatalities or situations posing imminent danger to workers, call OSHA's toll-free hotline at 800-321-OSHA (6742).

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NIOSH Publishes Results of Investigation Into Deutsche Bank Fire

Image via WikipediaOn August 18, 2007, two firefighters lost their lives while attempting to put out a fire in the former Deutsche Bank building.  This fire has had a significant impact on the construction and the asbestos abatement industries.  Recently revised asbestos regulations were the results of suggested changes by a special committee, set-up by Mayor Bloomberg, to specifically investigate the city agency failings and fixed them.  The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) typically investigates fires that lead to the loss of life of firefighters.  The purpose is to assist fire departments across the country in reducing fatalities and injuries to firefighters.  NIOSH's investigative report is 44 pages long and determined the following "key contributing factors to this incident included: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler systems (published in several news articles), delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity."
The report also includes several recommendations, and alot of information regarding what happened including a timeline.  So what started the fire?  A burning cigarette discarded by a construction employee in the decontamination shower area on the 17th floor.  Read the report for more information.

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Mayor Bloomberg Announces Changes To NYCDEP's Asbestos Enforcement

On July 16, 2008 Mayor Bloomberg announced changes that will impact how New York City Department of Environmental Potection (DEP), Department of Buildings (DOB), and Fire Department (FDNY) handle and coordinate construction, demolition, & abatement operations. Due to the death of two firefighters at the fire at 130 Liberty Street, New York City did a review of agency operations. That review resulted in a report called "Strengthening the Safety, Oversight, and Coordination of Construction, Demolition, and Abatement Operations." This report made 33 specific recommendations designed to strengthen each agencies' inspection practices, increase notifications and data sharing between agencies and improve the safety of abatement and demolition operations. Of the 33 recommendations, 4 addressed inspection processes, 12 adressed abatement operations, and 1 addressed demolition inspections at the DEP. The recommendations for the NYCDEP are:

Inspection Processes at DEP, DOB & FDNY:

• DOB, FDNY, and DEP should review their inspection criteria and make changes to ensure that, to the extent possible, inspections are prioritized on the basis of risk.
• DOB, FDNY, and DEP should create common safety protocols incorporating high-priority safety issues within the inspection capacity of all three agencies, and should cross-train inspectors to address these common safety issues.
• DOB, FDNY, and DEP should implement a system to share relevant results of inspections of buildings that meet agreed-upon criteria. As part of this effort, FDNY should develop a computer-based process to share inspection data internally and with DOB and DEP.
• DOB, FDNY, and DEP should review their inspection programs to ensure that they have sufficiently robust quality assurance controls in place.

Abatement Operations:

• DEP should regularly notify FDNY and DOB about large and/or complex abatement jobs that meet thresholds to be determined by DEP, FDNY, and DOB.
• DEP should establish a permit requirement for certain large and/or complex abatement jobs based on thresholds to be determined by DEP, DOB, and FDNY.
• DEP should require building owners and/or air monitors on abatement jobs to notify DEP when abatement work at a particular site is complete.
• DEP should promulgate clear guidance to contractors about how to maintain proper egress at abatement sites and enforce this requirement in the field.
• DEP should require that egress conditions be recorded daily in the abatement contractor's logbook and kept on site.
• DEP should require that all materials used in construction of temporary enclosures for abatement work be non-combustible or flame-resistant.
• DEP should require the installation of a central negative air "cut-off switch" or similar mechanism at abatement jobs that meet thresholds to be established by DEP, FDNY, DOB.
• DEP should develop written protocols, such as checklist or other guidance, to ensure that its inspections are comprehensive and consistent at all abatement jobs.
• DEP inspectors should be trained to inspect and address egress and other safety requirements at abatement sites.
• DEP should have the authority to enforce provisions of the Fire and Building Codes at abatement sites, including issuing Notices of Violation and other penalties.
• DOB should make permanent its capacity to have inspectors and other personnel respond to abatement sites-based on criteria to be established by DOB, DEP, and FDNY-to augment DEP and FDNY inspections at a particular site. DOB inspectors and other responders must have proper training and personal protective equipment to do this job.
• DEP should formally establish a policy that strictly limits simultaneous abatement and demolition work, and requires a variance-including review by DOB and FDNY-to undertake it.

Demolition Inspections:

• DOB, DEP, and FDNY should update their websites and publications to provide comprehensive and coordinated guidance about the construction, demolition and abatement processes, including how to file for and conduct these operations safely, and the regulatory schemes that are triggered by these operations.

Abatement Lessons Learned From Deutsche Bank Tragedy

On August 18, 2007, a fire at the former Deutsche Bank Headquarters located in Manhattan, New York claimed the lives of two New York City firefighters. After the fire, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspected the site and issued citations to Bovis Lend Lease, John Galt Corp., and Paradise Energy Electrical Contractors. These contractors were responsible or involved with the demolition and asbestos abatement work on the buildings. Bovis Lend Lease was being fined $193,000, John Galt Corp. was being fined $271,500, and Paradise Energy Electrical was being fined $6,250. OSHA found the following hazards at the worksite:

• Failing to inspect and maintain firefighting equipment to ensure that the standpipe system was operational and that sufficient water supply and presuure were available for firefighting
• Obstructed emergency exit access (including sealed emergency stairwells, emergency stairwells blocked by construction, and unlighted stairwells)
• Inadequate emergency escape procedures
• Unmarked exits
• Lack of fire extinguishers, emergency alarm procedures, and fire cutoffs
• Failing to develop and follow a fire protection program
• Smoking permitted in work areas
• Temporary structures inside the building made of combustible materials
• Scaffolds erected too close to power lines
• Unprotected sides and edges of work areas, unprotected floor openings, missing or broken guardrails, and missing stair rails
• Exposed live electrical parts, electrical panel boards in wet locations, and other electrical hazards.

Several of these items are reminders for abatement contractors and consultants, building owners, facility managers, general contractors, and project management firms. There are several OSHA regulations that apply to asbestos abatement, other than 1926.1101, and they require:

• That temporary structures, such as the decontamination facility, must be constructed of non-combustible materials such as fire retardant wood.
• Exists must be marked and alternate exits established. For example, using fluorscent paint to mark exits and designate alternate pathways.
• Construct blocked fire exits so workers could still use them. For example installing knives near the exists so workers can cut the poly, and construct kick-out panels to access the fire exits.
• Install a fire extinguisher (rated at least 2A) per 3000 square feet of protected building area. Install sufficient fire extinguishers so that the distance traveled shall not exceed 100 feet. At least one fire extinguisher shall be located adjacent to the stairway.
• Develop and follow a fire protection program that includes: the preferred method for reporting fires and other emergencies; evacuation policy and procedures; emergency escape procedures and route assignments, such as floor plans, workplace maps, and safe or refuge areas; names, titles, departments, and telephone number of individuals both within and outside your company to contact for additional information or explanation of duties or responsibilities under the emergency plan; procedures for employees who remain to perform or shut down critical operations, operate fire extinguishers, or perform other essential services that cannot be shutdown for every emergency alarm before evacuating; and rescue and medical duties for any workers designated to perform them.

New York State Department of Labor mentioned at the PACNY conference that there might be some changes in the future based on the information gathered from this tragedy. From OSHA's press release we can learn some of these lessons now and apply them to our current projects. Should you need any assistance with developing these programs or plans, you can contact us, and we can assist you.